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Abstract 
 
A defined contribution pension plan allows consumption to be redistributed from the plan 
member’s working life to retirement in a manner that is consistent with the member’s personal 
preferences. The plan’s optimal funding and investment strategies therefore depend on the 
desired profile of consumption over the lifetime of the member. We investigate these strategies 
under the assumption that the member is a rational life cycle financial planner and has an 
Epstein-Zin utility function, which allows a separation between risk aversion and the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution. We also take into account the member’s human capital during the 
accumulation phase of the plan and we allow the annuitisation decision to be endogenously 
determined during the decumulation phase. 
 
We show that the optimal funding strategy involves a contribution rate that is not constant over 
the life of the plan but is age-dependent and reflects the trade-off between the desire for current 
versus future consumption, the desire for stable consumption over time, the member’s attitude to 
risk, and changes in the level of human capital over the life cycle. We also show that the optimal 
investment strategy during the accumulation phase of the plan is ‘stochastic lifestyling’, with an 
initial high weight in equity-type investments and a gradual switch into bond-type investments 
as the retirement date approaches in a way that depends on the realised outcomes for the 
stochastic processes driving the state variables. The optimal investment strategy during the 
decumulation phase of the plan is to exchange the bonds held at retirement for life annuities and 
then to gradually sell the remaining equities and buy more annuities, i.e., a strategy known as 
‘phased annuitisation’.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The role of the pension plan in allocating consumption across the 
life cycle 
A typical individual’s life cycle consists of a period of employment followed by a period 
of retirement. Most individuals therefore need to reallocate consumption from their 
working life to retirement if they wish to avoid poverty in old age. A defined contribution 
(DC) pension plan can achieve this reallocation in a way that is consistent with the 
preferences of the individual plan member.
1
  
 
There are three key preferences to take into account. The first relates to the desire to 
smooth consumption across different possible states of nature within any given time 
period. The second relates to the desire to smooth consumption across different time 
periods. The third relates to the desire for current versus future consumption; saving for 
retirement involves the sacrifice of certain consumption today in exchange for uncertain 
consumption in the future. This uncertainty arises because both future labour income and 
the returns on the assets in which the retirement savings are invested are uncertain. The 
plan member therefore needs to form a view on both the trade-off between consumption 
in different states of nature in the same time period and the trade-off between 
consumption and consumption variability in different time periods. Attitudes to these 
trade-offs will influence the optimal funding and investment strategies of the pension 
plan.  
 
In a DC pension plan, the member allocates part of his labour income earned each year to 
the pension plan in the form of a plan contribution and, thus, builds up a pension fund 
prior to retirement. Then, at retirement, the member uses the accumulated pension fund to 
finance consumption in retirement by purchasing a life annuity, by keeping the fund 
invested and drawing an income from it, or some combination of these.2 The decisions 
                                                 
1
 The extent of this reallocation will be influenced by the level of pension benefits provided by the state and 
by the level of non-pension (e.g., housing) wealth owned by the individual. 
2
 Some jurisdictions place restrictions on some of these options. Some plan members might wish to 
exercise a further option, one which arises from a ‘bequest motive’, i.e., the desire to leave a bequest on 
 3
regarding the level of the contribution rate in each year before retirement
3
 (i.e., the 
funding strategy) is driven by the member’s preference between current and future 
consumption. As a consequence, the optimal funding strategy might involve a 
contribution rate into the plan that is not, as in most extant plans, a fixed percentage of 
labour income, but is, instead, age-related.  
 
The investment strategy prior to retirement (i.e., the decision about how to invest the 
accumulating fund across the major asset categories, such as equities and bonds) will 
influence the volatility of the pension fund (and, hence, the amount available for 
consumption in future periods), and so will depend on the member’s attitude to that 
volatility, both across states of nature and across time. After retirement, hedging 
longevity risk becomes an important additional consideration, so the investment strategy 
will now include annuities as well as the traditional asset categories.  
 
In this paper, we investigate the optimal funding and investment strategies in a DC 
pension plan assuming the member is a rational life cycle financial planner. To do this, 
we use a model that differs radically from existing studies in this field in three key 
respects. 
 
The first key feature of the model is the assumption of Epstein-Zin (1989) recursive 
preferences by the plan member. This allows us to separate relative risk aversion (RRA) 
from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Risk aversion is related to the 
desire to stabilise consumption across different states of nature in a given time period
4
  
and EIS measures the desire to smooth consumption over time.
5
  Thus, risk aversion and 
EIS are conceptually distinct and, ideally, should be parameterised separately.  
                                                                                                                                                 
death. We do not consider this further here, since bequests are usually satisfied outside of a pension savings 
framework and pension wealth is typically not bequeathable. 
3
 In the case where the plan member can exercise some choice. 
4
 An individual with a high degree of risk aversion wishes to avoid consumption uncertainty in a particular 
period and, more specifically, the reduction in consumption that would be required in an unfavourable state 
of nature, such as a large fall in equity prices. 
5
 An individual with a low EIS wishes to avoid consumption volatility over time and, in particular, a 
reduction in consumption relative to the previous time period. EIS is defined as: 
 4
 
Within the commonly used power utility framework, the EIS is given by the reciprocal of 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion (e.g., see Campbell and Viceira (2002)). This 
restriction has been criticised because it does not appear to reflect empirical observations. 
For example, based on the consumption capital asset pricing model of Breeden (1979), 
Schwartz and Torous (1999) disentangle these two concepts using the term structure of 
asset returns. Using US data on discount Treasury bond returns, equity market returns 
and aggregate consumption for 1964-97, their best estimate for the coefficient of RRA is 
5.65 (with a standard error of 0.22) and their best estimate of the EIS is 0.226 (with a 
standard error of 0.008). Thus, a high coefficient of RRA tends to be associated with a 
low level of EIS, but the estimated parameter values do not have the exact reciprocal 
relationship assumed in the power utility framework. Similarly, Blackburn (2006) rejects 
the reciprocal relationship on the basis of a time series of RRA and EIS parameters 
estimated from observed S&P 500 option prices for a range of different expiry dates 
between 1996 and 2003.6 
 
The second key feature of the model is the recognition that the optimal investment 
strategy will depend not just on the properties of the available financial assets, but also on 
the plan member’s ‘human capital’, defined as the net present value of an individual’s 
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where 
it
c  is consumption in period it  and ( )itU c
′  is the marginal utility of 
it
c . The sign and size of the 
EIS reflects the relationship between the substitution effect and income effect of a shock to a state variable, 
such as an increase in the risk-free interest rate. The substitution effect is always negative, since current 
consumption decreases when the risk-free rate increases because future consumption becomes relatively 
cheap and this encourages an increase in savings. The income effect will be positive if an increase in the 
risk-free rate (which induces an increase in the income from savings) leads to an increase in current 
consumption; it will be negative otherwise. If the income effect dominates, the EIS will be negative and an 
increase in the risk-free rate leads to an increase in current consumption. If the substitution effect dominates 
(which is the usual assumption), the EIS will be positive and an increase in the risk-free rate leads to a 
decrease in current consumption. If the income and substitution effects are of equal and opposite sign, the 
EIS will be zero and current consumption will not change in response to an increase in the risk-free rate: in 
other words, consumption will be smooth over time in the presence of interest rate volatility. 
6
 In particular, Blackburn (2006) found that, over the period 1996 to 2003, the RRA changed dramatically, 
whilst the EIS stayed reasonably constant.   
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future labour income.
7, 8  A commonly used investment strategy in DC pension plans is 
‘deterministic lifestyling’.
9
 With this strategy, the pension fund is invested entirely in 
high risk assets, such as equities, when the member is young. Then, at a pre-set date (e.g. 
5 to 10 years prior to retirement is quite common in practice), the assets are switched 
gradually (and often linearly) into lower risk assets such as bonds and cash. However, 
whilst intuitively appealing, there is no strong empirical evidence to date demonstrating 
that this is an optimal strategy.  
 
If equity returns are assumed to be mean reverting over time, then the lifestyling strategy 
of holding the entire fund in equities for an extended period prior to retirement might be 
justified, as the volatility of equity returns can be expected to decay over time (as a result 
of the ‘time diversification of risk’). However, there is mixed empirical evidence about 
whether equity returns are genuinely mean reverting: for example, Lo and Mackinley 
(1988),  Poterba and Summers (1988) and Blake (1996) find supporting evidence in both 
US and UK markets, while Kim et al. (1991) and Howie and Davies (2002) find little 
support for the proposition in the same countries. We would therefore not wish an 
optimal investment strategy to rely on a debatable assumption of mean reversion holding 
true in practice. 
 
A more appealing justification for a lifestyling investment strategy comes from 
recognising the importance of human capital in individual financial planning. Human 
capital can be interpreted as a bond-like asset in which future labour income is fairly 
stable over time and can be interpreted as the ‘dividend’ on the individual’s implicit 
holding of human capital.
10
 Most young pension plan members are likely to have a 
significant holding of (bond-like) human capital, but a negligible holding of financial 
assets, especially equity. Their pension fund should initially compensate for this with a 
                                                 
7
 We use the individual’s personal discount factor to determine the present value. Our results are not 
sensitive to the choice of discount factor used. 
8 The importance of human capital in a general portfolio choice setting has been emphasised by, e.g., Viceira (2001), 
Campbell and Viceira (2002), Cocco et al. (2005) and Gomes et al. (2008). 
9
 Also known as ‘ lifecycling’ or ‘age phasing’ (Samuelson (1989)). 
10
 As shown by Cairns et al. (2006), the real long-term average growth rate in labour income in developed 
countries over the last century is very similar to the long-run real average return on government bonds, 
hence labour income can be thought of as an implicit substitute for risk-free bonds. 
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heavy weighting in equity-type assets.
11
  The ratio of human to financial wealth will 
therefore be a crucial determinant of the optimal lifecycle portfolio composition. At 
younger ages, as shown in Figure 1, this ratio is large since the individual has had little 
time to accumulate financial wealth and expects to receive labour income for many years 
to come. Over time, as human capital decays and the value of financial assets in the 
pension fund grows, this ratio will fall and the pension fund should be rebalanced away 
from equities towards bonds.  However to date, there has been no quantitative research 
exploring the human capital dimension in a DC pension framework. 
 
Figure 1 – Decomposition of total wealth over the life cycle 
 
 
The third key feature of the model is the endogeneity of the annuitisation decision.  In 
some jurisdictions, such as the UK, there is a mandatory requirement to purchase an 
annuity with the pension fund up to a specified limit. The limit in the UK, for example, is 
                                                 
11
  By contrast, the human capital of entrepreneurs is much more equity-like in its potential volatility and so 
it is optimal for entrepreneurs to have a high bond weighting in their pension funds.  
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£20,000 per annum (as of 2011),
12
 and the annuity has to be purchased at the time of 
retirement. However, in many jurisdictions, including the US, Japan, Australia and most 
continental European countries, there is no requirement to purchase an annuity at all. In 
this study, we determine the optimal annuitisation strategy for the member.
13
   
 
1.2 Epstein-Zin utility  
The classical dynamic asset allocation optimisation model under uncertainty was 
introduced by Merton (1969, 1971). With a single risky asset (equities), a constant 
investment opportunity set, and ignoring labour income, the optimal portfolio weight in 
the risky asset for an investor with a power utility function, ( ) ( )1 1U F F γ γ−= − , where 
F  is the value of the fund of wealth and γ  is RAA, is given by: 
 
2
µ
α
γσ
=  (1) 
where µ  and 2σ  are the risk premium (i.e., mean excess return over the risk-free rate of 
interest) and the variance of the return on the risky asset, respectively.  
 
Equation (1) is appropriate for a single-period myopic investor, rather than a long-term 
investor, such as a pension plan member. Instead of focusing on the level of wealth itself, 
long-term investors focus on the consumption stream that can be financed from a given 
level of wealth. As described by Campbell and Viceira (2002, page 37), ‘they consume 
out of wealth and derive utility from consumption rather than wealth’. Consequently, 
current saving and investment decisions are driven by preferences between current and 
future consumption. 
 
To account for this, Epstein and Zin (1989) proposed the following discrete-time 
recursive utility function, which has become a standard tool in intertemporal investment 
models, but has not hitherto been applied to pension plans: 
                                                 
12
 State and occupational defined benefit pensions count towards this limit. 
13
 There is a positive voluntary demand for annuities in our model. See Inkmann et al. (2011) for a recent 
empirical analysis of the voluntary annuity market in the UK. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1
11
ϕ ϕ
γ γϕβ β
− −
− − −
+
 
 
 = − × + ×  
 
 
t t t tU C E U  (2) 
where 
• tU  is the utility level at time t , 
• 
tC  is the consumption level at time t , 
• γ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA),  
• ϕ  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), 
• β  is the individual’s personal one-year discount factor. 
 
The recursive preference structure in Equation (2) is helpful in two ways: firstly, it allows 
a multi-period decision problem to be reduced to a series of one-period problems (i.e., 
from time t  to time 1+t ) and, secondly, as mentioned previously, it enables us to 
separate RRA and EIS.  
 
Ignoring labour income, for an investor with Epstein-Zin utility, there is an analytical 
solution for the optimal portfolio weight in the risky asset (in the general case of a time-
varying investment opportunity set) given by:
14
 
 
( )( )1 1 1
2 2
cov ,1
1
µ
α
γσ γ σ
+ + +− = + − × 
 
t t t tt
t
t t
R U F
 (3) 
 
This shows that the demand for the risky asset is based on the weighted average of two 
components. The first component is the short-term demand for the risky asset (or myopic 
demand, in the sense that the investor is focused on wealth in the next period). The 
second component is the intertemporal hedging demand, which depends on the 
covariance between the risky asset return, 
1tR + , and the investor’s utility per unit of 
                                                 
14
 For more details, see Merton (1973) and Campbell and Viceira (2002, Equation (3.15)). 
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wealth, ( )1 1+ +t tU F , over time.15 The optimal portfolio weights, { }α t , are constant over 
time, provided that the investment opportunity set remains constant over time (i.e., 
µ µ=t ,  
2 2σ σ=t  and ( )( )1 1 1cov ,t t t tR U F k+ + +− = −  in Equation (3) above). 
 
A realistic lifecycle saving and investment model cannot, however, ignore labour income. 
Our aim in this study is to investigate the optimal asset allocation strategy for a DC plan 
member (during both the accumulation and decumulation stages of the plan) with 
Epstein-Zin utility who faces stochastic labour income and investment returns. We also 
derive the optimal profile of contribution rates over the accumulation stage of a DC plan. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model with Epstein-
Zin utility. In Section 3, we generate simulations of the two key state variables (equities 
and labour income) and derive the optimal funding and investment strategies for a DC 
pension plan member; we also conduct a sensitivity analysis of the key results. Finally, 
Section 4 contains the conclusions and discusses the issue of the issue of practical 
implementation. 
 
 
2 The model 
This section presents the model for solving the lifecycle asset allocation problem for a 
DC pension plan member. The model assumes two pre-retirement financial assets (a risky 
equity fund and a risk-free bond fund),
16
 a constant investment opportunity set, a 
stochastic labour income process, and the availability of an additional financial asset, 
namely a life annuity after retirement. We consider two aspects of labour income risk: the 
                                                 
15
 Thus, since the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ , will typically be greater than 1, the investor will 
reduce the equity weighting (relative to a myopic investor) as ( )( )1 1 1cov ,+ + +−t t t tR U F  falls in order to 
reduce the fall in utility when the return on the risky asset falls.  
16
 In our model, the only form of savings we allow is long-term savings in a pension plan and these are not 
accessible prior to retirement, so we implicitly assume precautionary savings are not needed in the model. 
Pension savings will be allocated to either an equity fund or a bond fund. As a consequence, financial 
wealth and pension wealth are equivalent and we use these terms interchangeably.  
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systematic volatility of labour income and the correlation between labour income growth 
and equity returns which determines the extent to which labour income affects portfolio 
choice.  
 
2.1 Model structure 
2.1.1 Constraints 
The DC pension plan member faces the following constraints: 
• in any year prior to retirement, contributions into the pension plan must be 
positive or zero; 
• members are not allowed to borrow from future contributions, implying that, prior 
to retirement, consumption must be lower than labour income; and  
• borrowing from the pension fund or short selling of pension fund assets is not 
allowed, and pension wealth can never be negative.
17
 
 
We will work with age rather than year as our temporal measure. The member is assumed 
to join the pension plan at age 20 without bringing in any transfer value from a previous 
plan and retire at age 65. 
 
2.1.2 Preferences 
The DC plan member is assumed to possess Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences, as described 
in Section 1.2 above, but adapted to allow for mortality risk at age x : 
                                                 
17
 These constraints recognize that savings in a pension plan are irreversible – this is what makes pension 
plans unique as an asset class. There can be additional saving outside the pension plan, but the immediate 
reversibility of this means that it can be treated as a form of (deferred) consumption and hence lumped 
together with ‘consumption’ for our purposes This allows us to focus on pension savings which are 
assumed to be allocated to an equity fund or a bond fund (any differences in the tax treatment of pension 
and non-pension savings are outside the scope of this study as these are jurisdiction specific). Given our 
categorization of reversible savings, we will treat financial wealth and pension wealth as equivalent and we 
use these terms interchangeably.  
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1
11
ϕ ϕ
γ γϕβ β
− −
− − −
+
 
  = − × + ×  
 
 
x x x x xU C p E U  (4) 
where 
• xU  is the utility level at age x , 
• 
xC  is the consumption level at age x , and 
• xp  is the (non-stochastic) one-year survival probability at age x , i.e., the 
probability that a member who is alive at age x  survives to age ( )1x+ . 
 
We assume that the member has a maximum potential age of 120. Thus, in the final year 
of age, we assume that 120 0p =  and, hence, Equation (4) reduces to: 
 ( ) ( )
1
1 11 1
120 1201 ϕ ϕβ
− − = − × 
 
U C  (5) 
which provides the terminal condition for the utility function.  
 
2.1.3 Financial assets 
Prior to retirement, the member has the choice of investing in a bond fund with a constant 
annual real return, r , and an equity fund with a return in the year of age x  to ( )1x+  
given by: 
 1,x x
R r Zµ σ= + +
 
for 20,21, ,120x = …  (6) 
where  
• µ  is the annual risk premium on the risky asset, 
• σ  is the annual volatility of return on the risky asset, and 
• { }1,xZ  is a series of independent and identically distributed (iid) standard normal 
random variables. 
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Whilst not necessarily corresponding precisely with the real world, the simplified 
assumption of independent and identically distributed returns on the risky asset 
considerably simplifies the numerical optimisation problem. 
 
2.1.4 Labour and pension income 
Prior to retirement, the member receives an annual salary at the start of each year of age 
x  to ( )1x+ , for 20,21, ,64x = … , and contributes a proportion xπ  of this into the 
pension plan. 
 
We adopt the stochastic labour income process used in Cairns et al. (2006), where the 
growth rate in labour income over the year of age x  to ( )1x+  is given by: 
 1
1 1, 2 2,
x x
x I x x
x
S S
I r Z Z
S
σ σ+
−
= + + +  for 20,21, ,64= …x   (7) 
where 
• 
Ir  is the long-term average annual real rate of salary growth (reflecting 
productivity growth in the economy as a whole), 
• 
xS  is the career salary profile (CSP) at age x , so that the term ( )1x x xS S S+ −  
reflects the promotional salary increase during the year of age x  to ( )1x+ , 
• 1σ  represents the volatility of a shock that is correlated with equity returns, 
• 2σ  represents the volatility of the annual rate of salary growth, and 
• { }2,xZ  is a series of iid standard normal random variables (independent of { }1,xZ ). 
 
The labour income received at age ( )1x+ , denoted by 1xY + , is given by: 
 ( )1 expx x xY Y I+ = ×  for 20,21, ,64= …x  
with normalisation such that 
20 1.0Y = . 
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Equations (6) and (7) are subject to a common stochastic shock, 
1,xZ , implying that the 
contemporaneous correlation between the growth rate in labour income and equity 
returns is given by ( )2 21 1 2σ σ σ+ .  
 
Following the work of Blake et al. (2007), we use a quadratic function to model the CSP: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2
20 4 20 3 20
1 1 1
45 45 45
x
x x x
S h h
   − × − × − = + × − + + × − + −          
 (8) 
 
Based on average male salary data (across all occupations) reported in the 2005 Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings, Blake et al. (2007) estimate parameter values of 
1 0.1865= −h  and 2 0.7537=h . Figure 2 shows the resulting labour income process, 
{ }: 20,21, ,65xY x = … , assuming 2%=Ir  and 1, 2, 0x xZ Z= =  for 20,21, ,64x = … . 
 
Figure 2 – Labour income process 
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When the plan member retires at age 65, we assume that he draws at least part of his 
pension in the form a life annuity, thereby hedging his own mortality risk. The annual 
amount of pension income received depends on the accumulated wealth level at 
retirement, the optimal ‘annuitisation ratio’ (i.e., the proportion of the accumulated fund 
used to purchase an annuity) and the price of a life annuity. The price of a life annuity (or 
the ‘annuity factor’) at age x  is calculated using the risk-free return, r , as follows: 
 
( )
120
0 1
x
s x
x s
s
p
a
r
−
=
=
+
∑ɺɺ  (9) 
where 
s xp  is the probability that a life of age x  survives to age ( )x s+ . 
 
We assume the annuity factor is constant over time for each age x , so we do not explore 
the additional risk faced as a result of volatility in the price of a life annuity (as a result of 
changes over time in the underlying interest rate and the mortality assumption used). The 
member invests the residual wealth that is not annuitised in the risky asset and, at each 
future age, decides whether to consume some of this residual wealth (in addition to the 
annuity income received) or to use some of it to purchase additional annuity income. 
After retirement, the only choice of financial asset will be between life annuities and the 
equity fund, since the bond fund is a dominated asset (see below). 
  
2.1.5 Pension fund dynamics 
Before retirement, the growth in the member’s pension wealth will depend on the 
investment strategy adopted, the investment returns on the equity and bond funds, and the 
chosen contribution rate. 
 
The contribution rate at age x  is given by: 
 x x
x
x
Y C
Y
π
−
=  for 20,21, ,64x = …  (10) 
We require the contribution rate to be non-negative, so that 
x xY C≥  before retirement. 
The contribution rate is allowed to vary over time, so that consumption in any period can 
adjust to changes in income level and investment performance.  
 15
 
A proportion, xα , of the member’s pension fund is assumed to be invested in the risky 
asset at age x  and, prior to retirement, we have the following recursive relationship for 
the dynamics of the pension fund: 
 ( ) ( )1 1,1x x x x x xF F Y r Zπ α µ σ+  = + × + + × +   for 20,21, ,64x = …   (11) 
 
The short-selling restriction requires that 0 1xα≤ ≤ .  
 
At the start of the year of age 65 to 66, the member is assumed to retire and chooses to 
continue to hold a proportion, 65α , of the accumulated wealth in the risky asset, with the 
remaining proportion of ( )651 α−  being used to purchase a life annuity at a current price 
of 65aɺɺ . At each future age, the member can choose to use some of the residual wealth 
(plus the annuity income received) to purchase an additional life annuity, allowing for the 
possibility that the annuitisation decision is itself dynamic. Thus, for 65,66, ,120x = … , 
the pension fund dynamics equation is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1,
1 1
1 0
x x x x
x x x x x x
x x
F F
F a F C r Z
a a
α α
α µ σ+ +
 − × − ×
= × + + − × + + + ≥ 
 
ɺɺ
ɺɺ ɺɺ
 (12) 
where: 
• ( )1 /x x xF aα− × ɺɺ  is the annual income from the annuity at age x and  
( ) 11 /α + − × × ɺɺ ɺɺx x x xF a a  is the capitalised value of this income stream (i.e., the 
value of the annuity) at age ( )1+x ; and 
• α x xF  represents the non-annuitised pension wealth at age x , immediately before 
receiving the current annuity income of ( )1 /x x xF aα− × ɺɺ  and consuming the 
chosen amount of 
xC ; this net amount is then invested in equities over the coming 
year, so the second term on the right hand side of Equation (12) is the value of the 
equity investment at age ( )1+x . 
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As the plan member’s age increases, the return from purchasing an annuity increases, 
provided that the member survives to receive the additional income. This component of 
the return on the annuity is known as the ‘mortality premium’.
18
 Eventually, the return 
from the annuity will exceed the return from the risky asset and then it becomes optimal 
to switch all remaining pension wealth into annuities.19 As will be seen later, based on the 
chosen investment and mortality parameters, the life annuity becomes the dominant asset 
class by age 76. Similarly, as a result of the mortality premium, it is unnecessary to 
include the risk-free bond fund within the asset allocation decision after retirement, as 
this asset is immediately dominated by the return on the life annuity.
 
  
 
Finally, we must constrain annual consumption after retirement such that it does not 
exceed the annual income from the annuity plus any remaining residual wealth: 
 
( )1 α
α
− ×
≤ +
ɺɺ
x x
x x x
x
F
C F
a
 
for 65,66, ,120x = …  
 
2.1.6 The optimisation problem and solution method  
The model has two control variables at each age x , for 20,21, ,120x = … : the equity 
allocation, 
xα , and the consumption level, xC . 
 
The optimisation problem is: 
                                                 
18
 This is also known variously as the ‘mortality drag’, ‘mortality credit’ or ‘survivor credit’. Consider the 
post-retirement wealth dynamics given in Equation (12). Suppose that we set 0xα =  (i.e., assume the full 
amount of the wealth is invested in the life annuity) and assume that 
x x xC F a= ɺɺ  (i.e., the member 
consumes the full amount of annual annuity income), then Equation (12) can be re-written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
1
1 1 1
1
x x
x x x x x x
x x x
F q
F a F C r F C r r
a p q
+ +
    
= × = − × + × = − × + + × +    
−     
ɺɺ
ɺɺ
 
where 1x xq p= − is the probability that a life of age x  dies before reaching age ( )1x + . The term 
( )( ) ( )1 1x xq q r− × +  is the ‘mortality premium’ and represents the additional return above the risk-free 
rate arising from the redistribution of annuity wealth from annuitants who died during the year to those who 
survive.  
19
 In the absence of a bequest motive. The value of an annuity is reduced to zero, the moment the plan 
member dies.  
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,
max
α xx xC
U  
with xU  defined as in Equation (4), subject to the following constraints: 
(i) for 20,21, ,64x = … , we have: 
a) a wealth dynamics equation satisfying: 
( ) ( )1 1,1 0x x x x x xF F Y r Zπ α µ σ+  = + × + + × + ≥  , 
b) an allocation to the risky asset satisfying 0 1xα≤ ≤ , and 
c) a contribution rate satisfying 0 1xπ≤ ≤ ; and 
(ii) for 65,66, ,120x = … , we have: 
a) a wealth dynamics equation satisfying Equation (12),  
b) an allocation to the risky asset satisfying 0 1xα≤ ≤ , and 
c) consumption satisfying 
( )1 x x
x x x
x
F
C F
a
α
α
− ×
≤ +
ɺɺ
. 
 
The Bellman equation at age x  is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 11 1
1
1 1 1
1
,
max 1
ϕ ϕ
γ γ
ϕ
α
β β
− −
− − −
+
 
  = − × + ×  
 
 
x x
x x x x x
C
V C p E V  (13) 
  
An analytical solution to this problem does not exist, because there is no explicit solution 
for the expectation term in the above expression. Instead, we must use a numerical 
solution method to derive the value function and the corresponding optimal control 
parameters. We use the terminal utility function at age 120 to compute the corresponding 
value function for the previous period and iterate this procedure backwards, following a 
standard dynamic programming strategy. 20   
                                                 
20
 See the Appendix for more details. Applications of the solution method include Weil (1990), Campbell 
and Viceira (2001) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005). 
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2.2 Parameter calibration 
We begin with a standard set of baseline parameter values (all expressed in real terms) 
presented in Table 1. The constant real risk-free interest rate, r , is set at 2% per annum, 
while, for the equity return process, we use a mean equity risk premium, µ , of 4% per 
annum
21
 and a standard deviation, σ , of 20% per annum. We use the projected PMA92 
table
22
 as the standard male mortality table, and hence, using a real interest rate of 2% per 
annum, the price of a whole life annuity paying one unit per annum at the start of each 
year of age from age 65 is 65 15.87a =ɺɺ . 
Table 1 – Baseline parameter values 
Asset returns  
Real risk-free rate, r  0.02 
Equity premium, µ  0.04 
Volatility of annual equity return, σ  0.2 
Preference parameters  
RRA, γ  5.0 
EIS, ϕ  0.2 
Discount factor, β  0.96 
Labour income process  
Starting salary at age 20, 20Y  1.0 
Average real salary growth, Ir  0.02 
Volatility of shock correlated with equity returns, 1σ  0.05 
Volatility of annual rate of salary growth, 2σ  0.02 
Career salary profile parameter, 1h  −0.276 
Career salary profile parameter, 2h  0.75835 
 
Our baseline plan member has the following preference parameters:  RRA = 5.0, EIS = 
0.2, and discount factor of 0.96β = .23  The starting salary at age 20 is normalised on 
                                                 
21
 In line with the recent literature, see, e.g., Fama and French (2002) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005). 
22
 PMA92 is a mortality table for male pension annuitants in the UK based on experience between 1991 and 
1994. We use the projected rates for the calendar year 2010, i.e., the table PMA92(C2010), published by the 
Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI) Bureau in February 2004.  We assume that there are no longevity 
improvements in the current version of the model. 
23
 This parameter constellation is common in the literature (e.g., Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002), Gomes and Michaelides (2004)). The values of RRA and EIS are also consistent with 
power utility for the baseline case.    
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unity. All absolute wealth and income levels are measured in units of the starting salary. 
In line with post-war UK experience, the annualised real growth rate of national average 
earnings, Ir , is assumed to be 2% per annum with a standard deviation of 2% per annum.  
 
3 Results 
3.1 Baseline case 
The output from the optimisation exercise is a set of optimal control variables (i.e., equity 
allocations, { }xα , and consumption levels, { }xC ) for each age 20, 21, ,120x = … . We 
generate a series of random variables for both the equity return and labour income shocks, 
and then generate 10,000 independent simulations of wealth and labour income levels.  
 
Figure 3 – Accumulated pension wealth 
 
 
Based on these simulations, Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of the accumulated 
pension wealth and the optimal consumption level for ages 20, 21, …, 120. In the early 
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years of the life cycle (i.e. up to age 35 or so), labour income is low and the desire to 
accumulate pension wealth to be consumed later is outweighed by the desire for current 
consumption and, as a consequence, the plan member makes no pension contributions at 
this stage. This conforms with observed practice, where younger plan members 
(especially those with a young family) seem unwilling (or unable) to contribute to their 
retirement savings on a voluntary basis. 
 
Figure 4 – Optimal annual consumption 
  
 
From Figure 1, we can see that human capital increases until about age 35. This is 
because of the very high rate of salary growth in the early years (relative to the discount 
factor, 0.96β = , applied to future labour income). Thus, whilst the member’s human 
capital is increasing, it is optimal to consume most (if not all) of the labour income 
received. 
 
However, when salary growth rates begin to slow down (after age 35) and human capital 
begins to fall, the retirement motive becomes more important as the member recognises 
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the need to build up the pension fund in order to support consumption after retirement. As 
a result, as can be seen from Figure 4, consumption remains largely constant from age 35 
onwards (despite the continuing, but slower, growth in labour income), with the 
additional income saved to fund post-retirement consumption.
24
  
 
After retirement, the member receives no further labour income, but instead starts to 
receive pension income (from any annuities purchased on or after retirement or from 
drawing down an income from the fund) and, hence, to enjoy consumption in retirement 
financed by running down the assets in the pension fund for the remainder of his lifetime.  
It can be seen from Figure 4 that the pension wealth accumulated at retirement is 
sufficient to maintain consumption at the pre-retirement level (and, thus, the strong desire 
for consumption smoothing, as reflected in the low baseline EIS value of 0.2ϕ = , is 
satisfied).
25
 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the optimal equity allocation at each age, 
{ }: 20, 21, ,120x xα = … , again based on 10,000 simulations. There is a high equity 
weighting at younger ages with a gradual switch from equities to bonds as the retirement 
age approaches. Prior to around age 45, the member optimally invests all pension wealth 
in the risky asset to counterbalance his implicit holding of bond-like human capital.  
After age 45 or so, human capital starts to decline very steeply and the member responds 
to this by rebalancing the pension fund towards bonds. This is because bonds and human 
capital are substitutes for most plan members, with the degree of substitutability inversely 
related to the correlation between labour income growth and equity returns, 
( )2 21 1 2σ σ σ+ .  
 
                                                 
24
 The variability in consumption levels across different scenarios for { }1,xZ and{ }2,xZ shown in Figure 4 is 
largely due to the variability in fund size (as shown in Figure 3), since the ratio  ( )x xC F is fairly constant. 
25
 The slight dip in consumption on retirement seen in Figure 4 is explained by the coarseness of the grid 
used to discretise the space spanned by the consumption control variable before and after retirement (as a 
result of the different constraints placed on consumption in these different stages of the lifecycle, see 
Section 2.1.6). Use of an ever finer grid would remove this effect, but as noted in the appendix, this would 
considerably increase the run time for solving the dynamic programming exercise. 
 22
 
Figure 5 – Optimal equity allocation 
 
 
This investment strategy is known as ‘stochastic lifestyling’, because the optimal equity 
weighting over the life cycle depends on the realised outcomes for the stochastic 
processes driving the state variables, namely the annual equity return and labour income 
growth rate, and will be different for each of the 10,000 simulations generated. It is 
important to note that the profiles in Figure 5 are not consistent with (nor, indeed, a 
justification for) the more traditional ‘deterministic lifestyling’ strategy.  
 
The member retires at age 65, but Figure 5 shows no immediate change in the optimal 
allocation to equities.
26
 However, the bond holdings are exchanged for life annuities 
which pay the retirement income.  Figure 5 shows that some of the equity fund is sold off 
each year and the proceeds used to purchase more life annuities, a strategy known as 
                                                 
26
 The lack of smoothness in the equity allocation above age 60 is again due to the discretisation procedure 
used by the solution method.  
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‘phased annuitisation’.
27
 This is to benefit from the mortality premium which increases 
with age and exceeds the equity risk premium from age 76 onwards, at which point it is 
optimal for the member to invest the entire residual value of the pension fund in life 
annuities, regardless of risk attitude.  
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the optimal contribution rate, corresponding to the 
wealth accumulation and consumption distributions shown in Figures 3 and 4 above. 
Until around age 35, when labour income is low but rising rapidly, it is optimal for the 
plan member to consume the entire labour income (resulting in no saving towards 
retirement).  Thus, the individual is effectively trading off a lower income in retirement in 
return for the ability to consume more in the early years when income is low. However, 
once human capital begins to decline, consumption no longer increases in line with 
labour income. Instead, consumption remains reasonably constant, allowing the 
additional labour income received each year to be saved. Thus, from age 35, the optimal 
contribution rate is back-loaded, increasing steadily with age to a rate of 30-35% at age 
55 (and remaining at this level until retirement at age 65). Whilst there is evidence that 
people do begin to save much more for their retirement once their children have left 
home and they have paid off their mortgage, it appears to be uncommon for people in 
most countries to save at the rate that we have found to be optimal. On the other hand, 
people also accumulate non-pension assets which can be used to finance retirement 
consumption and it should be remembered that our model does not include any other 
forms of savings or wealth holding (e.g., bank accounts and investment vehicles such as 
mutual funds, housing etc.).
28
  
 
Age-related contribution rates are not common in real-world DC plans. Much more 
common is a fixed rate throughout the life of the plan: for example, in the UK, the 
                                                 
27
 Other studies which show the optimality of gradual annuitisation over time include Milevsky and Young 
(2007) and Horneff et al. (2008). 
28
 It is worth noting that the pattern of consistently increasing real earnings assumed for the pension plan 
member considered here will not apply to certain occupations, such as manual labourers. To compensate for 
this, it will optimal for such workers to have a much more front-loaded pattern of pension contributions.  
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(combined employer and employee) contribution rate is typically between 8 and 10% per 
annum (GAD (2006, Table 8.2)).  
 
Figure 6 – Optimal contribution rate prior to retirement 
 
 
 
3.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the key parameters in the model. 
 
3.2.1 Coefficient of relative risk aversion  
Figure 7 shows the mean optimal contribution rate for different levels of RRA. In all 
cases, contributions begin between ages 35 and 40. Members with the lowest level of risk 
aversion (RAA = 2) begin saving for retirement slightly later than those with the highest 
level of risk aversion (RAA = 10) and save around 5% less of labour income each year 
prior to retirement.  
 
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 r
at
e
age
mean contribution rate 5th percentile 25th percentile
50th percentile 75th percentile 95th percentile
 25
As a result of the lower mean contribution rate, risk-tolerant members, ceteris paribus, 
will accumulate a lower mean level of pension wealth. They therefore need (and are 
willing to accept) a higher average equity allocation in the pension fund in an attempt to 
generate the desired higher level of retirement savings. As shown in Figure 8, for such 
members, the mean equity allocation decreases both later and more gradually, remaining 
at around 50% at retirement (compared with around 20% for the baseline member and 
around 10% for a member with RRA = 10). However, after retirement, the mean equity 
allocation reduces quickly and, regardless of the level of risk aversion, all pension wealth 
is held in a life annuity from age 76 onwards.  
 
Figure 7 – Mean optimal contribution rate: Effect of changing RRA 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the mean consumption profile with different RRA levels.29 The lower 
level of pension saving associated with lower levels of risk aversion enables higher 
consumption during the working life. Lower risk aversion after retirement and the 
associated greater equity weighting in the post-retirement pension fund will also result in 
                                                 
29
 The apparent drop in consumption at age 65 is again due to the discretisation procedure used by the 
solution method.  
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higher average consumption at older ages in comparison with a more risk-averse member. 
However, both pension wealth and the level of consumption supported by this wealth are 
significantly more volatile than when risk aversion is higher.
30
 
 
Figure 8 – Mean optimal equity allocation: Effect of changing RRA 
 
 
The increase in consumption at older ages for RRA = 10 can be attributed to the fact that, 
in this case, ( ) ( ) ( )EIS 0.2 1 RRA 0.1 1 1 1 1 1ϕ γ ϕ γ = > = ⇔ > ⇒ − − <  . Thus, from 
Equation (4), the utility at age x , xU , is increased by reducing current consumption, xC , 
and increasing future consumption, since, with the above relationship between EIS and 
RRA, the present value of the expected utility of future consumption is increased by more 
than the utility of current consumption is reduced. As a consequence of this, plan 
members with such characteristics choose not to consume all of the annuity income 
                                                 
30
 For RAA = 2, the inter-quartile range of the simulated distribution of accumulated pension wealth levels 
at retirement is 71.56 36.86 34.70− =  (compared with 70.22 41.36 28.86− =  for the baseline case of RAA 
= 5), while for the simulated distribution of annual consumption from age 76 onwards (when the full 
amount of the remaining wealth is invested in the life annuity), the inter-quartile range is 
4.86 2.42 2.44− =  (compared with 4.55 2.67 1.88− =  for the baseline case). 
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received. Instead, it is optimal for them to use some of this income to purchase additional 
annuities, thereby providing higher income (and, thus, enabling higher consumption and 
hence utility) in future (provided, of course, that the individual survives to receive this 
additional income).  This is considered further below when we analyse the sensitivity of 
the results to changes in the EIS parameter. 
 
Figure 9 – Mean optimal consumption: Effect of changing RRA 
 
 
3.2.2 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution  
Figure 10 shows the mean optimal contribution rate for different levels of EIS.  In the 
middle stages of the life cycle (i.e., between age 35 and age 55), a member with a lower 
level of EIS will tend to save slightly more towards retirement (about 1-2% of income 
more per annum). This can be explained by the fact that a member with a lower EIS is 
less willing to accept a fall in consumption in future (particularly after retirement) and is, 
thus, prepared to contribute slightly more now to build up a higher fund at retirement 
(thereby reducing the likelihood of requiring such a decrease in consumption 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
m
ea
n
 c
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
age
RRA = 5 (baseline) RRA = 10 RRA = 2
 28
subsequently). However, in the last 10 years or so before retirement, this effect is 
reversed. By this stage, a typical member’s labour income can be expected to begin to 
decline slightly as retirement approaches (see Figure 2). Thus, a member with the low 
EIS is less willing to cut current consumption in response to this fall in income (and so 
contributes less to the pension plan at this time). In comparison, a member with a high 
EIS of 0.5 is able to maintain an annual contribution rate that is about 4-5% higher at this 
time, which makes up much of the deficit built up as a result of the lower contributions 
prior to age 55. The overall result is that the fund built up at retirement and, thus, the 
post-retirement consumption supported by this fund are relatively insensitive to the EIS 
level, as can be seen in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 10 – Mean optimal contribution rate: Effect of changing EIS 
 
 
For a given level of risk aversion, Figure 11 shows that a low EIS of 0.01 leads to a 
slightly lower equity weighting (of about 2-3%) at each age prior to retirement compared 
with a high EIS of 0.5. This follows because a member with a low EIS prefers more 
stable consumption and will therefore accept less equity risk. 
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Figure 11 – Mean optimal equity allocation: Effect of changing EIS 
 
 
Figure 12 – Mean optimal consumption: Effect of changing EIS 
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Figure 12 shows the mean consumption profile for different EIS levels. The desire of a 
member with a low EIS to achieve consumption stability from one time period to the next 
is clearly evident. In contrast, a member with a higher level of EIS is more willing to cut 
consumption slightly prior to retirement (when labour income begins to fall), thereby 
maintaining a higher contribution rate into the pension plan (as seen in Figure 10 above). 
Similarly, after retirement, a higher level of EIS encourages the member to consume 
slightly less than the full amount of the annuity income received and to use some of the 
resulting savings to purchase additional annuity income. If the member survives to high 
ages, the size of the mortality premium in the annuities purchased allows consumption to 
increase substantially if EIS is high relative to RRA (in particular, if EIS (1 RRA)> ). 
However, the probability of the member surviving to such high ages is extremely low. 
Figure 13 shows the mean expected consumption profile at each future age (allowing for 
the effects of mortality risk) for a life of age 20. In this case, it can be seen that the effect 
of changing the EIS level on expected consumption is minimal (unless the member 
survives to a very high age and benefits from the effects of the mortality premium as 
shown in Figure 12).  Further, such behaviour appears to be uncommon in practice, 
suggesting that we are unlikely to observe many individuals with EIS (1 RRA)> .   
 
3.2.3 Personal discount factor 
Figures 14, 15 and 16 show the outcomes from conducting a sensitivity analysis on β , 
the individual’s personal discount factor, on the mean optimal contribution rate, 
consumption profile and equity weighting, respectively. 
 
Individuals with a low personal discount factor (or high personal discount rate) value 
current consumption more highly than future consumption in comparison with 
individuals with a high personal discount factor. This will lead, ceteris paribus, to both a 
lower average contribution rate into the pension plan prior to retirement, as shown in 
Figure 14
31
 and a downward-sloping consumption profile after around age 40, as shown 
                                                 
31
 Although in the years immediately prior to retirement, pension contributions are belatedly increased to 
 31
in Figure 15.  There will be a correspondingly slower accumulation of financial wealth 
and therefore a higher ratio of human to financial wealth throughout the working life. 
This, in turn, leads to an optimal lifestyle strategy with a higher allocation to the risky 
asset throughout the working life, together with a shorter switching period, as shown in 
Figure 16. The figure also shows that, whatever the size of the personal discount factor, 
there is a common equity weighting in the fund by the time the member reaches age 65. 
This indicates that the optimal investment strategy after retirement will not be influenced 
by the size of the personal discount factor. 
 
Figure 13 – Mean optimal expected consumption at age 20 (allowing for 
mortality risk): Effect of changing EIS 
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Figure 14 – Mean optimal contribution rate: The effect of changing the 
personal discount factor, β  
 
Figure 15 – Mean optimal consumption The effect of changing the personal 
discount factor, β  
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Figure 16 – Mean optimal equity allocation: The effect of changing the 
personal discount factor, β  
 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined optimal funding and investment strategies in a DC 
pension plan using a life cycle model that has been extended in three significant ways: 
• the assumption of Epstein-Zin recursive preferences by the plan member which 
enables a separation between relative risk aversion and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, 
• the recognition of human capital as an asset class along with financial assets, such 
as equities and bonds, and 
• endogenising the decision about how much to annuitise in retirement.  
 
Our key findings with respect to funding are: 
• The optimal funding strategy involves an age-dependent annual contribution rate, 
increasing steadily from zero prior to age 35 to around 30-35% by age 55 (but 
then reducing slightly as labour income falls in the years immediately prior to 
retirement, so as to maintain pre-retirement consumption levels).  
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• The effect of lower risk aversion is to reduce the level of pension contributions at 
all ages (in the expectation of achieving higher investment returns on those 
contributions during the accumulation phase). However, as would be expected, 
the downside of this is greater uncertainty in both the pension fund at retirement 
and the retirement consumption supported by this fund.  
• Prior to retirement, a lower level of EIS leads to a slightly higher contribution rate 
prior to around age 55 (with the aim of building up a higher pension fund and, 
thus, reducing the risk of a fall in consumption after retirement), but then to a 
lower contribution rate in the years immediately prior to retirement (when the 
member is less willing to cut consumption as labour income falls and, thus, the 
contribution rate into the pension plan must be reduced). The overall effect of a 
lower EIS is greater consumption stability over the life cycle. The effect of a 
higher EIS is to increase the willingness of the plan member to accept 
consumption volatility over time (and, in particular, a fall in the level of 
consumption from one time period to the next). A high level of EIS in relation to 
RRA (such that EIS (1 RRA)> ) implies that, after retirement, it is optimal for the 
member to spend less than the pension income received and use the resulting 
savings each year to purchase additional annuities (thereby benefiting from the 
mortality premium inherent in the return on life annuities).  
• A lower personal discount factor implies a preference for current (rather than 
future) consumption, leading to a lower contribution rate until the last 10 years or 
so before retirement when current consumption has to be reduced sharply each 
year, and thus retirement savings increased, to ensure a minimal level of pension 
wealth.  
 
Our key findings with respect to investment strategy are: 
• The optimal investment strategy is also age-dependent. Pre-retirement, the 
optimal strategy is stochastic lifestyling, rather than the more conventional 
deterministic lifestyling. While the optimal weighting in equities is initially very 
high and subsequently declines as the retirement date approaches, it does not do 
so in a predetermined manner as in the case of deterministic lifestyling. Instead, 
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the optimal equity weighting over the life cycle depends on the realisations of the 
stochastic processes determining equity returns and labour income. Stochastic 
lifestyling is justified by recognising the importance of human capital and 
interpreting it as a bond-like asset which depreciates over the working life. An 
initial high weighting in equities is intended to counterbalance human capital in 
the combined ‘portfolio’ of human capital and financial wealth. In time, the 
weighting in equities falls stochastically, while that in bonds rises as human 
capital decays over time.  
• Another difference with deterministic lifestyling is that the portfolio is not 
completely switched into bonds by the retirement date. Depending on the 
member’s risk aversion, there could still be significant equity holdings in the 
pension fund on the retirement date. For the ranges of risk aversion that we 
considered in this study, the optimal equity weighing at retirement varied between 
20% and 50%. 
• The optimal investment strategy at retirement is phased annuitisation. The first 
stage of this strategy is to exchange the bond fund for a life annuity, thereby 
securing lifelong income protection for the member as well as benefiting from the 
mortality premium in the return on the annuity. The optimal weight in the equity 
fund does not immediately change. However, each year that the member survives, 
the return from buying additional annuities increases and the equity weighting 
falls until a point is reached when the mortality premium exceeds the equity risk 
premium and it becomes optimal to switch the entire residual pension fund into 
annuities whatever the member’s attitude to risk.  
• The effects of lower risk aversion and a lower personal discount factor are to 
increase the length of time over which the pension fund is fully invested in 
equities and to reduce the length of the switchover period into bonds prior to 
retirement. Lower risk aversion leads to a higher post-retirement equity weighting, 
but does not affect the age at which it is optimal to switch the remaining pension 
fund assets into annuities (this decision depends purely on the relationship 
between the relative sizes of the mortality premium and the equity risk premium).  
The size of the personal discount factor has no effect on the optimal asset 
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allocation after retirement. The size of the EIS has a marginal impact on the 
optimal asset allocation both before and after retirement. 
 
The results in this paper have some important implications for the optimal design of DC 
pension plans: 
• They provide some justification for age-related contribution rates in DC pension 
plans. Because individuals tend to prefer relatively smooth consumption growth, a 
plan design involving a zero contribution rate prior to around age 35 with an 
increasing age-dependent contribution rate thereafter (reaching, on average, 
around 30 to 35% per annum in the period immediately prior to retirement) offers 
higher expected lifetime utility than one with fixed age-independent contribution 
rates. Greater contribution rate flexibility would allow for the preferences of 
individual members (with regard to their desire for consumption smoothing, risk 
attitude and relative preference for current over future consumption) to be 
recognised. While high, heavily back-loaded, age-related contribution rates might 
be optimal for ‘econs’ (i.e., rational life cycle financial planners), they might not 
be optimal for ‘humans’ with their behavioural difficulties in starting and 
maintaining long-term savings programmes (see, e.g., Thaler and Bernartzi (2004), 
Mitchell and Utkus (2004) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008)).  A compromise 
solution might be a compulsory minimum contribution rate at all ages (to ensure 
that all plan members have some minimal pension fund to support consumption in 
retirement) together with age-related additional voluntary contributions (AVCs) at 
higher ages. 
• It is important to get reliable measures of the member’s risk aversion and personal 
discount factor. This can be achieved using appropriately designed questionnaires 
(see, e.g., Coller and Williams (1999), Holt and Laury (2002), Andersen et al. 
(2008) and Laury et al. (2011)). However, EIS seems to be less important 
according to our sensitivity analysis. This is helpful, since it is unlikely that we 
would be able to design a questionnaire that could elicit a member’s EIS even if 
the member understood what an EIS meant! The lack of sensitivity of both the 
contribution rate and investment strategy to the EIS suggests that we could fix the 
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EIS at a level that happened to be convenient for us. A particularly convenient 
level would be to choose the EIS to equal the inverse of the RRA, i.e., at a level 
consistent with power utility. The study by Schwartz and Torous (1999) cited 
above showed that while there was an inverse relationship between EIS and RRA, 
the relationship is not exactly reciprocal. Nevertheless, it was fairly close for a 
typical individual, so using a reciprocal relationship in a practical application 
might be a reasonable approximation for most people and it would also help to 
speed up the numerical solution algorithm. 
• It is very important to incorporate the salary process in the optimal design of a DC 
pension plan. For most people, their human capital will be bond-like in nature and 
this will have a direct impact on the optimal contribution rate and asset allocation 
decisions, in particular, justifying a high weight for equities in the pension plan. 
However, for senior plan members whose salary levels (including bonus and 
dividends from their own stock holdings) may have a strong link with corporate 
profitability, their labour income growth rate might be much higher than the 
return on bonds and might also be more volatile. In this case, their human capital 
will be more equity-like in nature and so the optimal investment strategy will be 
more heavily geared towards bonds.  
• An investment strategy involving a switch from equities to bonds as members 
approach retirement is appropriate for DC pension plans, even when equity 
returns are not mean reverting. However, the switch away from equities is 
stochastic rather than predetermined, and is dependent on past investment and 
salary growth experience. Nevertheless, the switch should typically be made 
earlier than in traditional lifestyle strategies (i.e., from age 45 or so rather than age 
55, which is more common in practice). Also, unlike most traditional lifestyle 
investment strategies, the optimal equity weight in the portfolio immediately prior 
to retirement is not reduced to zero (rather it depends on the risk attitude of the 
individual).  The practical implementation of such an investment strategy would 
not actually be that challenging if we had reliable measures of the member’s risk 
aversion and discount factor and could assume that the EIS was equal to the 
reciprocal of the RRA. Figure 5 shows that for a given RRA, discount factor and 
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EIS, the distribution of the optimal equity allocation is very narrow. An 
approximate solution for the optimal equity weighting could be that derived by 
Campbell and Viceira (2002, Equation (6.1)) in the case where labour income is 
deterministic rather than stochastic (where xH is the value of human capital at age 
x):   
                                    
2
2
2
1 xx
x
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µ σ
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 +
= + 
   
                                                  (14) 
Since the optimal investment strategy depends on the member’s RRA, discount 
factor and EIS, and since these differ across members, it is unlikely that a single 
default investment fund will be appropriate for all plan members. 
• A life annuity is a critically important component of a well-designed pension plan. 
As a result of the mortality premium inherent in the return on a life annuity, the 
full amount of the pension fund should eventually be annuitised in old age 
(regardless of an individual’s RRA, EIS or personal discount factor).
32
 This is true 
despite the well-known aversion to annuitisation by ‘humans’ documented in 
Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) and Mitchell and Utkus (2004), and despite 
both their theoretical usefulness (Yaari (1965), Davidoff et al. (2005)) and 
money’s worth (Mitchell et al. (1999), Finkelstein and Poterba (2002)) and their 
recognized value by annuitants once purchased (Panis (2004)).  
                                                 
32
 In the absence of a bequest motive. 
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Appendix – Numerical solution of the dynamic programming 
problem  
From Equation (4), the Epstein-Zin utility function at age x  is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1
11
ϕ ϕ
γ γϕβ β
− −
− − −
+
 
  = − × + ×  
 
 
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We assume that the member is subject to mortality risk with a maximum possible age of 
120. Thus, in the final year of age, we assume that 
120 0p =  and, thus, the terminal utility 
function is given by (c.f., Equation (5)): 
 ( ) ( )
1
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120 1201 ϕ ϕβ
− − = − × 
 
U C  
 
The optimisation problem is then: 
,
max
α xx xC
U  
subject to the constraints given by: 
• x xC Y≤  for 20,21, ,64x = … ;  
• 
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 for 65,66, ,120x = … , and  
• 0 1xα≤ ≤  for 20,21, ,120x = … . 
 
Then, from Equation (13), the Bellman equation at age x  is given by: 
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Because there is no explicit solution for the expectation term in the above expression, an 
analytical solution to this problem does not exist. 
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The most popular numerical solution method is value function iteration (see, e.g., Judd 
(1998, page 257-266)). This involves the discretisation of the state variables by setting up 
a standard equally-spaced grid and solving the optimisation for each grid point for the 
penultimate age. The expectation term in the Bellman equation is then approximated by 
using quadrature integration and then the dynamic optimisation problem can be solved by 
backward recursion. 
 
To avoid choosing a local maximum, we discretise the control variables (i.e., asset 
allocation and consumption) into 20 equally-spaced intervals (with corresponding grid 
points) and optimise using a standard grid search. As an important step in solving the 
stochastic dynamic programming problem, we need to discretise both the state space and 
shocks in the stochastic processes (i.e., equity return and labour income growth). Pension 
wealth and labour income (prior to retirement) are discretised into 30 and 10 evenly-
spaced intervals, respectively, in the computation.33 
 
It is possible that the values of the state variable from the previous time period are not 
represented by a grid point, in which case, an interpolation method (e.g., bilinear, cubic 
spline, etc.) must be employed to approximate the value function. The approach requires 
knowledge of the distribution of each of the shocks to the system, so that appropriate 
quadrature integration (e.g., Gauss-Hermite quadrature) can be used. 
 
Thus, to solve the non-linear expectation part in the Bellman equation above (i.e.,
 ( )
1
1x xE V
γ−
+
 
  ), we discretise the standard normal random variables, 1,xZ and 2,xZ , 
representing the shocks to the equity return and labour income growth processes in year 
of age x  to ( )1x+ , respectively, into 9 nodes, 34 giving (where π  is the mathematical 
constant): 
                                                 
33
 Clearly, the choice concerning the number of intervals is subjective, but we felt that the choices made 
here represent an appropriate trade-off between accuracy and speed of computation. 
34
 Nine nodes is a standard setting in the existing literature.  
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where: 
• ( ){ }1, : 1, 2, ,9xZ m m = …  and ( ){ }2, : 1, 2, ,9xZ n n = …  are the Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature nodes for the random variables 
1,xZ  and 2,xZ   respectively; and 
• ( ){ }1, : 1, 2, ,9xZ mw m = … and ( ){ }2, : 1, 2, ,9xZ nw n = …  are the corresponding Gauss-
Hermite quadrature weights. 
 
Then, the resulting state variables dynamics are given by: 
• for 20,21, ,64x = … , we have: 
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• for 65,66, ,120x = … , we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1,1 1 1 2α αα µ σ+ +  − × − ×= × + + − × + + + × 
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Substituting the Gauss-Hermite approximation for the expectation term in the Bellman 
equation above, we derive the value function and the corresponding optimal control 
variables at each grid point. We then iterate the procedure back from age 119 to age 20. 
The computations were performed in MATLAB.
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 http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/.  
